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Introduction: Eight Myths of 
Conflict and Development in the 
Middle East
Jan Selby and Mariz Tadros
Abstract In this introductory article we identify eight myths of conflict 
and development related to the Middle East region. Some of these myths, 
which cut across academia, foreign policy and development interventions, 
are specific to the Middle East; others are ‘global’ myths that regional 
developments contradict. We do not claim to be the first to identify 
all these myths; many of our arguments are indebted to a long history 
of critical scholarship. The articles in this IDS Bulletin all speak to the 
disconnects, disjunctures and misconceptions highlighted here.
Perhaps more than any other region or in any period of  post-Cold War 
history, the Middle East since the Arab Spring constitutes a significant 
challenge to established ideas about development and its relationship 
with conflict. The struggles of  democracy movements, the resilience and 
rebirth of  authoritarian regimes, the regional conflagration around Syria, 
new experiments with Islamism, and the return of  geopolitics all, in one 
way or another, challenge these established ideas. The Middle East has 
always been something of  an outlier within development thinking and 
practice: development policy and the discipline of  development studies 
have always taken sub-Saharan Africa, South Asia and Latin America 
as their central reference points, not the Middle East. But with so much 
international attention currently on the Middle East, it is worthwhile 
examining what trends and events there tell us about development and 
the role of  conflict therein. This is what we try to do in this article. 
In what follows, we identify eight myths of  conflict and development 
related to the Middle East region. Some of  these myths are specific to 
the Middle East; others are ‘global’ myths that regional developments 
contradict. We do not claim to be the first to identify all these myths; 
many of  our arguments are indebted to a long history of  critical 
scholarship. Moreover, we should emphasise that we do not mean to 
suggest that these myths are adhered to all of  the time: a diversity of  
views about development and the ‘development–security nexus’ of  
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course exists. However, we think that these myths cut across a great 
deal of  academia, policy and practice, and provide underpinning 
assumptions for development thinking and interventions, even when 
they are only implicit. Myth number one is a clear case in point.
Myth number 1: that there is a unilinear model of development
The idea that development is a linear process, whereby societies progress 
through a series of  steps from ‘low’ to ‘high’ development, or from 
‘traditional’ to ‘modern’ forms, is one of  the hallmarks of  modern 
development thinking. So also is the assumption that just one overall 
form or direction of  this process exists, whatever the minor or temporary 
deviations from it. Such assumptions were explicit in classical early 
‘modernisation theory’, in which, at least by Rostow’s account, societies 
were understood to develop through five stages of  economic growth, 
from ‘tradition’ to ‘maturity’ and ‘high consumption’, with different 
societies being at different stages of  this process (Rostow 1960). Few now 
understand development in such explicitly unilinear terms. Nevertheless, 
at a more implicit level, the belief  in the existence of  a single linear model 
of  development continues to underpin much development thinking and 
practice. It is implicit in the oft-voiced claim that there is a direct positive 
relationship between economic and political liberalisation – that is, in 
claims that economic growth, commercial interests, trade and investment 
interdependencies, and consumer power naturally build up pressure 
for democratisation. It is no less implicit in the standard modernist 
dictum that modernisation is associated with the decline of  religion and 
weakening of  communal and sectarian identities, as politics and identities 
realign around the de-secularised national state (see e.g. Berger 1999). 
It was assumed by the ‘end of  history’ mentality that characterised the 
early post-Cold War years (Fukuyama 1992). And it is implicit, too, in the 
notion of  ‘transition’, whereby ‘countries in transition’ are assumed to be 
transitioning from some abnormal to a normal liberal development path. 
In reality, of  course, there is no unilinear model of  development: there 
is neither a single direction nor a single destination, nor even a single 
route towards it. In this broadest of  senses no correlates of  development 
exist – as the Middle East, more strikingly than any other region, makes 
clear. Thus, on the Arabian Peninsula, in particular, rapid economic 
development, urbanisation, global economic integration and, more 
recently, financialisation have been associated not with the withering 
of  authoritarian regimes, but with their entrenchment. Across the 
Middle East – as also elsewhere – modernisation has been associated 
not with the weakening of  religious, communal and sectarian identities, 
but with their consolidation and reinvention. Contra Fukuyama, 
no post-ideological or post-historical convergence has occurred, but 
rather an explosion of  political projects and forces, most obviously on 
the Islamist side but also including, for instance, anti-capitalist and 
anarchist movements (Cemgil and Hoffmann, this IDS Bulletin). What 
we see in the contemporary Middle East, in sum, is not a region that is 
transitioning from tradition to modernity, but one where rapid economic 
and social change, and politically inspired ‘revolutions of  backwardness’ 
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(Matin 2013), have produced strikingly hybrid social and political 
structures, in which ‘modern’ and ‘traditional’ forms are juxtaposed, and 
from which the direction of  future development is far from clear.
Myth number 2: that low development and violent conflict are natural 
bedfellows
Nothing illustrates the continuing allure of  the unilinear model of  
development better than the widely held assumption that there is a clear 
correlation as well as causal relationship between low development and 
violent conflict. The belief  in such a linkage almost goes without saying 
in post-Cold War development thinking and policy, and is the founding 
assumption of  the very idea of  the ‘security–development nexus’: that 
under-development is a central motor of  conflict, which in turn is an 
obstacle to development, trapping poor societies in a vicious cycle of  
poverty and violence. Kofi Annan’s contention that ‘there can be no 
long-term security without development; there can be no long-term 
development without security’ (quoted in Allouche and Lind 2013: 1); a 
former UK International Development Secretary’s claim that ‘the higher 
a country’s GDP per capita, the lower the risk of  internal war’ (Mitchell 
2010); Paul Collier’s characterisation of  war as ‘development in reverse’ 
(Collier 2003); Shimon Peres’ claim that ‘poverty and distress’ in the 
Middle East’ have given rise to ‘fanaticism, fundamentalism and false 
messianism’ (Peres 1993: 45–6); and Thomas Friedman’s thesis that once 
a country has a middle class large enough to support a MacDonald’s 
franchise, or an industrial base large enough to provide parts for his 
laptop computer, it will no longer go to war (Friedman 1999: 195; 2005: 
ch. 12) all illustrate this line of  thinking. The contemporary post-conflict 
‘peace-building’ project does the same, its fundamental rationale and 
overall objective being to transform vicious cycles of  under-development 
and conflict into virtuous cycles of  peace and prosperity. The guiding 
premise is that all bad things go together, as do all good things. 
For most of  the period after the collapse of  the Berlin wall, the 
concentration of  the world’s civil wars in sub-Saharan Africa at least 
lent the myth of  security and development some superficial plausibility. 
Even during this period, however, it should have been evident that low 
development and conflict were unlikely to remain so tightly correlated. 
Historically, large-scale violence has been a universal and therefore 
arguably necessary feature of  the transition to capitalist modernity, 
among early and later developing societies alike (Moore 1967; Cramer 
2006); and historically, also, for the majority of  the twentieth century 
nothing even close to a positive relationship between high development 
and peace existed. Indeed, if  anything the relationship was negative, 
with the industrial powers of  Europe, the United States (US), the Soviet 
Union and Japan being the leading practitioners and exporters of  war. 
These historical patterns alone undercut the cosy assumption that 
under-development and violent conflict are natural bedfellows. But the 
Arab Spring and its aftermath have completely blown it apart. Since 
2011, large-scale civil violence has rocked Bahrain, Egypt, Iraq, Libya, 
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Syria, Tunisia, Turkey, Palestine and Yemen – all, with the exception 
of  Palestine and Yemen, being middle-income countries with largely 
urban and quite highly educated populations (and Palestine would fit this 
description too, were it a state). These conflicts, in turn, have reversed a 
long-term downturn in the worldwide incidence of  civil war (Pettersson 
and Wallensteen 2015). Economic dislocation was of  course an important 
factor behind these uprisings and ensuing violence, including impacts 
resulting from economic liberalisation (as in Syria: Dahi and Munif  
2011; Hinnebusch 2012) and the global financial crisis of  2007–8 (Dahi 
2012). But they cannot be explained by such economic factors alone, 
much less by ‘low development’: they were fundamentally political in 
their causes and aims, rooted in the political structures and contradictions 
of  incumbent regimes. Regionally and globally, economic development 
continues apace – however disfunctionally in many states – but this is not 
translating into greater social or political peace. The correlation between 
low development and conflict has, in short, clearly been broken. 
Myth number 3: that there is an alternative rentier path of development
Rentier state theory provides an important counter-argument to the above, 
essentially suggesting that the Middle East’s modern development path, 
though deviating from the standard liberal model of  development, has 
nevertheless been determined by economic forces in a quite predictable 
way. In the classical liberal model, growing economic productivity in society 
unleashes political change, as the state, fiscally reliant as it is on taxation, 
becomes hostage to demands for representation. In the rentier variation 
of  this model, by contrast, the state has a high degree of  fiscal autonomy 
from society, courtesy of  its access to international rents – whether from 
hydrocarbon or mineral production, transit fees, international aid, or global 
investments. As a result, rentier theorists claim, such states are less reliant 
on taxation, are not so vulnerable to demands for ‘no taxation without 
representation’, and are in turn far less likely to develop strong democracy 
movements or democratic institutions. On the contrary, the theorists claim, 
such states assume an autonomy from and power over society, are essentially 
‘distributive’ rather than ‘productive’, and thus become characterised not 
just by deepening authoritarianism, but also by patronage, clientelism, 
and the construction of  powerful internal security apparatuses (for classic 
statements, see e.g. Beblawi and Luciani 1987). From this perspective, there 
is thus a natural correspondence between high hydrocarbon production and 
export dependence on the one hand, and illiberal politics on the other. The 
Middle East’s supposedly exceptional development path can be summed up 
in a single three-letter word: oil.
The attractiveness of  this theory lies in its parsimony and superficial 
empirical plausibility. It provides an easy way of  explaining, for instance, 
why the Gulf  emirates have achieved such rapid economic development 
without political liberalisation, and have become home to such striking 
juxtapositions of  modernity and tradition. Simultaneously, it also 
functions as the exception that proves the rule, in effect assuming and 
affirming the myth of  unilinear development discussed above. Yet 
for all this, rentier state accounts of  Middle Eastern development are 
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deeply flawed. Rent-dependent states, including oil-producing ones, 
have always been characterised by a wide variety of  political systems 
and forms, from the liberal democratic (e.g. Norway), to the centralised 
authoritarian (e.g. the Gulf  emirates), through to the chaotically and 
violently decentralised (e.g. Nigeria). And context-specific historical 
and political factors explain these differences, not the simple formula 
of  access to external rents – just as also applies in relation to the 
‘developmental state’ (see e.g. Kohli 2004). 
Moreover, as developments since 2011 have shown, the supposed 
authoritarian ‘resilience’ (Anderson 1991) of  the Middle East’s rentier 
states is a myth. Libya, a classical authoritarian rentier state, has collapsed 
into civil war with little prospect of  reconsolidation. Neighbouring Egypt, 
by contrast, has displayed striking ‘authoritarian resilience’ – indeed, an 
authoritarian return – despite its much lighter dependence on external 
rents. The resilience of  Bahsar al-Assad’s regime in Syria owes little to 
oil production, because most of  this has been lost to the opposition. And 
the Middle East region as a whole, which for so long was characterised 
by retarded political development, but nonetheless regime durability and 
‘stability’, is clearly no longer thus. The reason is clear: Middle Eastern 
states are not following a single or set development path, not even one 
that is determined by hydrocarbon resources (Beilin 2012).
Myth number 4: that fragile statehood is the main institutional cause 
of violence
The institutional corollary of  the thesis that low development causes 
violent conflict is the claim that weak, failed or fragile statehood does 
too. The United Kingdom (UK)’s first National Security Strategy 
summed up this view well:
In the past, most violent conflicts and significant threats to global 
security came from strong states. Currently, most of  the major threats 
and risks emanate from failed or fragile states. A failed state is one 
whose government is not effective or legitimate enough to maintain 
the rule of  law, protect itself, its citizens or its borders, or provide the 
most basic services. A fragile state is one in which those problems are 
likely to arise (UK Cabinet Office 2008: 14).
Although the term ‘failed state’ has since fallen out of  favour, the concept 
of  ‘fragile state’, which is now preferred, does not constitute a significant 
departure from it – as the above quote makes clear. Today, state ‘fragility’ 
is understood as the central institutional conflict-development problem, 
and state ‘resilience’, its opposite, as the solution; but both are essentially 
understood as being about (actual or potential) state weakness. 
Putting to one side the fact that, historically in the Middle East, the 
concept of  ‘resilience’ has been applied to many authoritarian rentier 
states that have imploded; and putting aside also the frequent circularity 
of  fragile state reasoning – fragile statehood contributes to violence, 
and we know which states are fragile because they are home to high 
levels of  violence – the broader problem with the focus on weak or 
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fragile states is that it is utterly inattentive to, and obscures, the abiding 
centrality of  state actions and state power in practising, facilitating and 
otherwise causing political violence. The fragile state thesis boils down, 
in essence, to a claim that deficits of  state capacity, legitimacy and 
authority, and the absence of  the state in ‘ungoverned spaces’, underpin 
internal violence. But such deficits are typically accompanied by, and 
a consequence of, the powerful presence of  state and state-backed 
forces, and their preparation for and resort to violence. In countries 
from Colombia to Sri Lanka to Sudan, it is not simply the weakness or 
fragility of  the state that has been the problem, but the combination 
of  internal legitimacy deficits (and not nationwide: only within certain 
regions, or among certain groups) and state militarism and repression 
(Stavrianakis and Selby 2013). Geopolitical dynamics – state-on-state 
diplomatic and economic support, plus the training and arming of  
state and paramilitary forces – are of  course a key element in this. So 
far, so obvious. Indeed, the only thing that is surprising here is that 
contemporary conflict–security discourse, obsessed as it is with state 
‘weakness’ and ‘fragility’, continues to be so blind to these issues. 
Nowhere illustrates this better than the contemporary Middle East, where 
the post-2011 upsurge in political violence has been state, military (formal 
and informal) and geopolitically dominated. Here we must mention: 
the violent repression of  the initial Arab Spring uprisings by military, 
security and police forces in most of  the region’s states; the overthrow of  
democratically elected regimes; the aerial bombing and mass displacement 
of  populations not only in Syria, but also in Gaza, Iraq, Libya, Turkey 
and Yemen; renewed regional geopolitical machinations (which have 
involved, for instance, the Saudi state waging war directly in Yemen, 
while fighting local proxies in Syria and supporting the overthrow of  the 
Muslim Brotherhood government in Egypt, all as part of  its struggle for 
regional hegemony with Iran; and Turkey facilitating the rise of  Islamic 
State (IS), while waging war against its own Kurdish population and using 
its Syrian refugees as a bargaining chip with Europe (Reuters 2016)); and, 
for all its supposed ‘anti-interventionism’, the West’s wide-ranging military 
involvement in the region, as indicated by the fact that the US currently has 
military forces based in at least ten Middle Eastern states (see e.g. Heritage 
Foundation 2015: 103–4, whose list of  eight does not include Israel and 
Turkey), and that the UK continues to arm the region’s states, contravening 
the 2014 Arms Trade Treaty (Wintour 2014). It is hard but to conclude, 
given all this, that regional and international state actions and state power 
are the central motor of  political violence in the contemporary Middle 
East. Yet no one would guess this from the language of  state fragility.
Myth number 5: that environmental scarcities are an increasingly 
important contributor to conflict
A further recurring if  secondary theme in contemporary conflict-
development thinking is the belief  that environmental pressures 
are an increasingly important backdrop and contributor to conflict. 
Population growth, combined with rising consumer demand and the 
ceaseless intensification of  resource exploitation, is without doubt 
(Endnotes)
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placing growing pressures on land, water and other ‘ecosystem services’; 
and for many, the inevitable upshot of  this is mounting societal and 
international competition over scarce resources, increasing vulnerability 
to environmental shocks, and in turn proliferating impacts on 
livelihoods and stability. Global anthropogenic climate change is widely 
identified as an additional concern, one that will – or may already be – 
be acting as a ‘threat multiplier’ to conflict in some of  the most unstable 
parts of  the world (CNA Military Advisory Board 2007). This thesis, 
far from marginal, has found its way into the national security strategies 
and development policies of  most Western states, and United Nations 
(UN) bodies have widely adopted it too (see e.g. Selby and Hoffmann 
2014b). Moreover, it is invoked more than anywhere else in relation to 
the Middle East, and to Syria in particular. The Syrian civil war, so the 
story goes, was in part sparked off by a severe climate change-induced 
drought that caused mass internal displacement, growing pressures on 
host communities, and in turn political protests, repression and war 
(Femia and Werrell 2012; Kelley et al. 2015). For its proponents, Syria 
is only the most conspicuous example of  a broader trend and offers a 
glimpse of  what is to come as the planet steadily warms. 
Again, there is without doubt much superficial plausibility to this thesis, 
buttressed as it is by fears about the very sustainability – the resilience – 
of  our resource- and energy-intensive global hydrocarbon civilisation. 
And yet, it has shortcomings. For one, there is no consistent or reliable 
evidence of  environmental pressures and shocks significantly contributing 
to any recent mass political violence. Quantitative studies are deeply 
divided on the issue, and their findings – whether positive or negative – 
are in any case mostly statistical artefacts (Selby 2014). The 2003–5 war in 
Darfur, which was described as the ‘first climate change war’ (Mjøs 2007; 
Mazo 2010: 73–86), was, it is now widely acknowledge, nothing of  the 
sort (Selby and Hoffmann 2014a). And the evidence that climate change, 
drought and ensuing migration played a significant contributory role in 
Syria’s civil war is frankly derisory: among other problems, there is no 
evidence at all that drought migrants were either heavily involved in, or 
were targets of, any of  Syria’s early protests (Selby and Hulme 2015). 
Such case evidence aside, there are broader reasons why environmental 
pressures do not inexorably translate into or exacerbate conflicts. Local 
environmental resource ‘carrying capacities’ are not set by nature alone, but 
also by technology and society, with new understandings and new technical 
interventions repeatedly making new resources available (in relation to 
water, for example: from far-away surface sources, to groundwater, to 
recycled wastewater, to the sea). And environmental resources are, in 
economic and political terms, of  generally declining relative importance. 
Land and water, for example, are used above all for agriculture; and the 
relative decline in the economic and political value of  agriculture, as shown 
by its generally declining contribution to GDP and employment, and the 
increasingly urban bases of  political regimes, means that the economic 
and political value of  water is in turn declining (Selby 2005). Such counter-
tendencies make environmental conflicts less likely, not more. 
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Myth number 6: that countries need to pass a number of milestones on 
a democratisation pathway 
The twists and turns of  political transformation in Arab countries where 
revolts have occurred, such as Egypt and Tunisia, profoundly contest 
Western theories of  democratisation. Many of  the earlier theories 
assumed that countries emerging from authoritarian regimes needed to 
achieve a number of  milestones to make the bridge from democratic 
transition to democratic consolidation (Rustow 1970). Many more 
recent studies suggest the contrary, however. For instance, Carothers’ 
study of  twentieth-century regime changes in seven regions of  the 
world contests a series of  assumptions about democratic transitions: 
that regime change necessarily shifts towards democracy; that 
democracy evolves through phases (from breakthrough to transition to 
consolidation); that elections are of  determinative importance; that elite 
pacts are crucial to the arrival of  new governance strategies; and that 
democracy- and state-building are mutually re-enforcing endeavours 
(Carothers 2002). Carothers suggests that countries typically assume 
political pathways and outcomes that are in the ‘grey zones’, involving 
all kinds of  configurations of  power that do not fit into pre-conceived 
democracy-promoting models.
Yet since 2011, faith in a linear pathway to democracy has continued 
to inform the policy prescriptions of  most Western academics and 
policymakers. This was very much captured in the language of  
‘democratic transition’ that characterised Western policy debates in 
2011–13. In practice, this concern with ‘a transition to democracy’ 
became heavily associated with processes of  holding and monitoring 
elections. Rather than seeing elections as one of  many important 
proxies for the people’s expression of  voice, they became a synonym 
for democracy itself. For example, after the Muslim Brotherhood came 
to power in Egypt in 2012, citizens continued to express their voice 
through – among other means – demonstrations, marches and sit-ins to 
protest against economic hardship, monopolisation of  political power, 
and the absence of  personal and public safety. 
Concurrently, the revolutionary forces never stopped proclaiming 
that ‘the revolution is ongoing’. Ali Bakr shows in his article in this 
IDS Bulletin that the Muslim Brotherhood’s assumption of  power did 
not herald the adoption of  progressive pro-social justice policies in 
Egypt, a finding that parallels Dalacoura (2016)’s comparison of  the 
Muslim Brotherhood in Egypt and Al-Nahda’s policies in Tunisia. Rezk 
captures the sentiment in 2012, showing how citizens’ high aspirations 
that the government that assumed power after the ousting of  president 
Hosni Mubarak (1981–2011) would be pro-poor and pro-youth were 
disappointed. Rezk argues that the replacement of  Mubarak’s crony 
entourage with yet another business elite, this time affiliated to the 
Brotherhood, plus the governance challenges that the new leadership 
faced, led to widespread dissillusionment and fuelled the angry 
protests that resulted in the collapse of  Mohamed Morsi (2012–13)’s 
government in June 2013. 
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Yet much of  the Western academic and policy analysis from that 
period focused on elections as the appropriate pathway by which 
revolutionaries should endeavour to achieve their goals, citizens 
express their voice, and elites challenge the new configuration of  
power (Carothers 2013; Lynch 2012; Ottaway 2013; Stepan 2012). 
Democracy, in such a narrow, linear framing, was reduced, in the eyes 
of  one Egyptian analyst, to a ‘boxocracy’ (Ezzat 2013). The outcome 
of  framing democracy from a Western perspective produced new 
disconnects in understanding why people joined a mass uprising in 2013 
in even larger numbers than in 2011. 
A new round of  legislative elections took place in Egypt in December 
2015–early 2016, and once again the ballot box proved to be redundant 
in capturing the pulse of  the citizenry in terms of  the changing political 
preferences of  populations across time. Ten years earlier, former US 
secretary of  state Condoleezza Rice praised the ‘democratic transition’ 
in Iraq where citizens had participated in three national elections 
(CNN 2005). Elections were once again used as a proxy for democracy, 
even when they entailed high levels of  violence and produced highly 
exclusionary outcomes for parts of  the citizenry. Clearly the privileging 
of  elections as a proxy for citizen voice can be dangerous and 
disconnected from contexts in which people are resorting to a myriad of  
ways of  expressing their agency, both violent and non-violent. Whatever 
the political predicament of  the Syrian civil war, let us hope that 
building an inclusive, stable political order is not reduced once more to 
confusing a ‘ballotocracy’ for democracy.
Myth number 7: that more humanitarian aid will contain the Syrian 
refugee crisis
At the top of  Amnesty International’s eight-point plan to address the 
global refugee situation is ‘continuous, sufficient and predictable funding 
for refugee crises’. In Amnesty’s view ‘all humanitarian appeals for 
refugee crises must be fully funded, in addition to providing meaningful 
financial support to countries that host large numbers of  refugees to 
help them provide services to refugees and their host communities’ 
(Amnesty International 2015). A major conference held in London 
in February 2016, hosted by the UK government, urged wealthy 
countries to commit to increase aid for the Syrian humanitarian crisis 
(see Deane, this IDS Bulletin). It is unquestionnable that funding is 
urgently needed to address humanitarian needs, but ultimately there is 
a need to understand that the humanitarian regime is deeply flawed in 
fundamental ways. 
How geopolitical interests systematically trump the wellbeing of  civilians 
lies at the heart of  the redundancy and sometimes harm associated 
with humanitarian policy. Since the beginning of  the Syrian civil war, 
Western actors have time and again prioritised geostrategic interest 
over humanitarian policy, even when humanitarian disasters could 
have been mitigated or addressed in a way that would have benefitted 
the populations in question the most. Former president of  Finland and 
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Nobel Peace Prize winner Martti Ahtisaari argued that the Western 
powers failed to engage with a Russian proposal in 2012 for Assad step 
aside as part of  a peace deal because they were so convinced that the 
Syrian president was about to be toppled. At that time, around 7,500 
people had been killed in the Syrian conflict; by early 2016, the number 
was more than 470,000 (Borger and Inzaurralde 2015; Barnard 2016). 
A high-level official for a multilateral agency that was managing one 
part of  the relief  operation in Syria at the time said that in 2012 he had 
proposed to Western powers that the humanitarian aid effort should 
focus on resettling Syrians who were fleeing the war zone in parts of  
the country where there was no fighting. He explained that investing 
in income-generating opportunities and expanding the capacity of  
local education and health systems in the non-war zones would have 
been far less traumatic for them than to become refugees outside their 
country. However, he said that the Western donors would hear none 
of  it because they feared that investing in regime-held territories would 
strengthen Assad; and besides, they were confident that it was only a 
matter of  months before he was gone.
The Syrian regime has unquestionably committed atrocities that 
amount to crimes against humanity; however, the point here is that the 
execution of  a foreign policy premised on Assad’s overthrow rather than 
a political settlement has not only led to a serious threat to the territorial 
integrity of  the country – parts of  which are under IS control – but 
also the escalation of  a humanitarian disaster unprecedented since 
the Second World War. At a civil society conference that was held in 
parallel to the London conference, the director of  advocacy group The 
Syria Campaign, James Sadri, said: 
Donors are being asked to give [US]$9bn and not a penny of  
that will reach the most vulnerable people in the besieged areas. 
That’s the elephant in the room. If  the biggest UN aid operation in 
history is happening while people are starving to death something is 
fundamentally wrong (Wintour and Black 2016).
The problem is not only that geostrategic priorities trump a people-
centered policy, or that the humanitarian regime needs to be well 
funded, but that it also needs to be fundamentally reconfigured. In this 
IDS Bulletin, Dawn Chatty argues that in establishng refugee camps 
and channelling assistance through these the humanitarian regime only 
reaches a minority of  displaced and dispossesed people, a situation that 
the UN has acknowledged in its estimates that ‘over 70 per cent of  the 
Syrian refugee flow across international borders is self-settling in cities, 
towns and villages where they have long-established social networks. 
Many refuse to register as refugees and so are “invisible” to aid 
agencies.’ Chatty also notes that in the neighbouring countries that are 
hosting the majority of  Syrian refugees – Jordan, Lebanon and Turkey 
– the message that participants in the research conveyed was clear: self-
settlement was far better than encampment. 
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In many of  these surrounding countries, some Syrian families have 
social networks that they can rely on to access income-generating 
activities to survive temporarily until they can return home. The policy 
of  containment in camps that the UN High Commissioner for Refugees 
(UNHCR) manages in Jordan has led to the increased impoverishment 
of  Syrians as it has deprived them of  opportunites to earn a living or 
rely on their networks outside the camps. The refugee containment 
process was so unpopular with refugees, notes Chatty, that UNHCR 
early on resorted to separating extended families to minimise the 
prospects of  protest, waiting until it was dark to allocate tents to them in 
different parts the camp. 
The application of  humanitarian blueprints in Syria based on 
experiences from other parts of  the world has rendered aspects of  the 
aid administration entirely disconnected from the lived realities of  the 
refugees. The Syrians fleeing the crisis are part of  a complex ethno-
religious, middle-income region of  the world, yet the humanitarian 
operations have assumed they have the same background and needs as, 
for example, refugees in sub-Saharan Africa, whose social and economic 
profile is very different. Chatty argues that if  the humanitarian 
regime had listened to the priority needs that dispossessed Syrians 
expressed, it could have adopted measures that made a meaningful 
difference. Undoubtedly some humanitarian actors have listened, but 
Chatty’s analysis shows that where Western humanitarian assistance 
programmes were set up as they were in Jordan and Lebanon, they 
were disconnected from Syrians’ needs and priorities – which is not 
surprising, because they were rarely ever consulted. 
Shelley Deane’s article in this IDS Bulletin on Syria’s lost generation 
notes that the international humanitarian regime has failed to address 
the educational needs of  the 5.4 million children inside Syria, of  whom 
2.1 million are not in school; and, ‘[of] the 1.4 million Syrian refugee 
children in Syria’s neighbouring host states 50 per cent are not in 
school.’ Deane identifies several factors that have contributed to this, 
such as state incapacity to absorb large numbers in host countries, boys 
dropping out of  school (to work to earn a living) and girls also (to marry, 
relieving their families of  an additional mouth to feed and to protect the 
girls’ honour by having a second family that is concerned for their safety 
and security). 
Generations are losing out on schooling, in stark contrast to the pre-war 
education system where 93 per cent of  children in Syria were enrolled 
in schools. Informal educational opportunities and standardised 
curricula, language and leadership training are all needed to address 
the educational gap. However, educational services are piecemeal, 
sometimes inaccessible and often ill fitted to the needs of  Syrian 
children. Moreover, international support for young people to enrol 
in higher education is absent, because it is deemed a low priority for 
humanitarian aid interventions, which focus more on what they perceive 
as the ‘basics’. 
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Myth number 8: that, following the Arab Spring, people’s agency has 
been defeated 
Against the backdrop of  civil wars (Libya and Syria), IS occupation 
(Iraq, Syria), threat of  famine (Yemen), severe encroachments on 
freedoms (Egypt, Turkey), the ongoing Arab–Israeli conflict (Palestine), 
and strong ripple effects on neighbouring countries (Lebanon), the 
mood of  optimism around the 2011 ‘Arab awakening’ has waned. In 
Western media, academia and policy circles, talk of  a perpetual ‘Arab 
Winter’ (The Economist 2016; Hinnebusch 2012) has replaced the Arab 
Spring rhetoric. As Jessica Winegar has written in a powerful and 
reflective piece, the Western media currently portrays the region as 
‘just one miserable homogeneous place of  violence, terror, religious 
fanaticism and authoritarianism’. And yet, she adds, ‘what is missing in 
these portrayals is the fact that in an area of  the world with 350 million 
individuals spread across nearly 25 countries, there is not one story. In 
fact, there are positive events everywhere’ (Winegar 2016).
A number of  complex reasons account for the absence of  nuanced 
representations of  the multiple forms of  positive agency that Winegar 
speaks of, and the implications are grave. The negation of  the agency 
of  the multitude has a serious bearing on our understanding of  
pathways of  change, the pulse of  the citizenry, and the dynamism and 
myriad faces of  resistance and defiance. Underpinning the negation 
of  some forms of  citizen agency is a narrow focus only on those forms 
of  activism that directly contest the authority of  regimes and employ 
accepted modalities of  resistance (especially movements that press for 
democracy by holding protests and marches). 
In contrast, when citizens repeatedly organise around issues of  
economic wellbeing and personal safety by blocking roads, refusing to 
leave government premises until their grievances are taken seriously 
or standing silently in front of  their syndicates and unions, holding 
placards with their demands, these forms of  contentious politics are 
often dismissed as irrelevant to processes of  political transformation. 
For example, before the January 2011 uprising in Egypt, much of  the 
literature spoke of  the inertia that characterised Egyptian political 
culture – despite being at a time when people were publicly and 
collectively defying norms of  compliance and subservience (Tadros 2012; 
Ali 2012). If  we examine the plurality of  expressions of  dissent from 
Syrians’ protests in the refugee camps in Atimeh on the Syria–Turkey 
border, to secondary students protesting over educational policies in 
Egypt, we find forms of  political engagement that are fluid, dynamic and 
may have unexpected ripple effects. 
A second important factor contributing to the negation of  citizen 
expressions is normative: when citizens protest against regimes that 
Western democracy ‘experts’ and academics have deemed to be bad, 
their agency is celebrated; whereas when citizens rise up against regimes 
that they consider to be illegitimate, but which in the eyes of  the West 
are ‘democratic’, then the citizens are either condemned or made 
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invisible. Irrespective of  the outcome of  the uprising of  June 2013 
against the Egyptian regime, people had in effect gone out in the hope 
that, by bringing down a president who had failed to deliver on his 
promises, they would bring an end to their deteriorating circumstances. 
Clearly, the political configuration of  power that emerged was hardly 
conducive to the achievement of  the 2011 January uprising’s calls for 
‘bread, freedom and social justice’ – and so much less so the highly 
authoritarian regime that holds power now. 
However, it was a people’s uprising that reinforced Egyptians’ belief  
that they need not acquiesce to a ruler they did not want. Yet because 
the 2013 uprising occurred against a ruler who came to office through 
procedural democracy (elections), the way that many represented the 
revolt against the Muslim Brotherhood emphasised that it was anti-
democratic and had destroyed any prospect of  genuine democracy 
(Fadel 2014). The same normative judgement is at work when Western 
experts criticise Egyptians for not pursuing the path prescribed 
for them; for example, in the claim that ‘the problem with Egypt’s 
revolution is not that it is eating its children; instead many of  its children 
are devouring it’ (Brown 2014). 
A distinct but related myth is that the conspiracy to bring down 
a democratically elected regime that heralded a unique Islamist 
democratic experiment in Egypt has ignited Islamist jihadi activism 
in the region. Such a myth is premised on the notion that by Islamists 
participating in and gaining victory at the ballot box, there was a 
genuine opportunity for democratising radicals who would have faith in 
the system and abandon violence. According to this myth, the sudden 
overthrow of  the Morsi regime catalysed Islamists to pick up arms. 
Ali Bakr’s article in this IDS Bulletin points to the increase in violence 
in 2013 after the demise of  Morsi’s government; however, its detailed 
mapping of  radical Islamist activism shows that movements began 
to flourish as far back as 2011. Following the Arab revolts in 2011, 
against the backdrop of  relaxed border controls, the breakdown of  the 
security apparatus and increased political opportunities for activism, 
radical Islamist movements began to build up their recruits and acquire 
weapons. In other words, it was not in reaction to the downfall of  the 
Morsi regime that jihadists became active; it was at that critical juncture 
when society and politics were being re-ordered that radical Islamists 
sought to instate their own rule and governance. 
At a historical moment when counter-revolutionary forces wish to make 
people’s uprisings invisible, it is critically important to resist defeatist 
narratives that deny the power of  the multitude to challenge political 
orders. The notion of  ‘prefiguration’ is important here. Grounded in 
anarchist theory, prefiguration refers to ‘a political action, practice, 
movement, moment or development in which certain political ideals 
are experimentally actualised, in the “here” and “now”’ (Van De Sande 
2013: 23). Prefiguration offers a lens through which to resist counter-
revolutionary narratives by deconstructing them but also by creating 
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alternative ones. The case of  Rojava is not without its weaknesses, 
problematics and inequalities; however, as Cemgil and Hoffmann 
describe in their article in this IDS Bulletin, it represents a case of  
experimentation with an alternative social, political and economic 
order that seeks to establish more participatory, egalitarian forms of  
governance. By emphasising the power of  people’s ability to challenge 
red lines, and to collectively engage in a common struggle of  liberation, 
the idea of  prefiguration can help us to ‘recognise the value and 
significance of  certain practices which when seen from a ‘chessboard-
perspective’ may not be deemed ‘successful’ or ‘important’ or significant 
at all’ (ibid.: 238); in other words, one of  appraising an action exclusively 
in terms of  its ability to achieve an immediate desired reaction. 
The value of  prefiguration lies not only in challenging counter-
revolutionary narratives, but also in challenging the internalisation 
of  power, empowerment and powerlessness. When citizens see and 
experience the ability to bring down the status quo through mass 
mobilisation, and from that, recognise their own power, it fundamentally 
changes the way they engage with oppression. They may not necessarily 
always revolt through mass demonstrations and protests, but they can 
strategically choose means of  resistance that allow them to transgress 
and defy red lines in significant ways. 
Akram Alfy in this IDS Bulletin exposes ways that youth movements have 
tactically used violence in Egypt since the January 25, 2011 uprising to 
challenge the status quo that has been unresponsive to their demands 
for political and economic reform. He argues that it is not so much 
the existence of  a youth bulge that is a predictor of  violent expressions 
of  agency, but a constellation of  factors, which include the very high 
level of  education that characterises their profile, that is important. 
The structural problem that pre-dates the uprising persists to this day: 
a youth cohort educated to tertiary level is unable to find adequate 
employment in a context where few channels exist by which to hold the 
government to account. They are sure to continue to create their own 
channels to express grievances, even if  they do not necessarily resort to 
violence in the future. 
Authoritarianism may reproduce itself  through the reconfiguration of  
discourses and practices that instil terror and oppression. However, when 
people revolt and bring down political orders, something happens to 
them and this ‘something’ needs to be kept alive because it can serve as a 
perpetual reservoir of  resistance. Without romanticising people’s power, 
there is ultimately a need to challenge the myth that people have reverted 
to complacency, apathy and apolitical engagement, just because they do 
not do politics the way Western democracy experts expect them to. 
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